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Economic Democracy and Enterprise Form in Finance 
 
William H. Simon 
 
 In terms of institutional design, “democratizing finance” could play out in one 
or both of two trajectories.  First, there is what Fred Block in his introductory essay 
calls the “public utility model”.  This approach would tighten regulation of 
enterprises that would continue to be organized as for-profit or investor-owned 
corporations.  The second would transfer responsibility and resources to 
organizations constructed to internalize public goals and values – government 
agencies or corporations, cooperatives, and charitable nonprofits.   
 The first course is less radical.  The “public utility” model is basically the one 
that is now in place.  Block would tighten regulation, but only one of his proposals 
seems a major departure from current practice – limitations on profits. The 
alternative institutions emphasized in the second approach currently exist in 
various manifestations, but moving them to the center of the financial system would 
involve an epochal change. 
 To the extent that reform is guided by democratic ideals, the two approaches 
involve different instantiations of democracy.  In the regulatory approach, actors 
accountable to general electoral processes impose external constraints on 
organizations that retain discretion to pursue private goals within the constraints.  
In the second approach, political responsibility is imputed to actors within the 
organization, and they are expected to use their discretion to further public values 
as well as the private interests of the organization’s constituents.  
 I propose to consider the rationales for the second approach and the forms 
that democratized ground-level financial institutions might take.  There are two 
relevant types of democracy – general electoral democracy and stakeholder 
democracy.  And with each of these types, it is worth distinguishing between 
relatively direct and relatively indirect forms of democratic control. I suggest 
reasons for thinking that the most directly democratic forms are not necessarily the 
most promising.   
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 The key rationale for the move to more democratic forms is to better align 
managerial incentives with public interests.  Such alignment requires not only 
redirection but also broadening of incentives.  Thus, effective enterprise reform 
requires the creation of techniques of monitoring and performance assessment that 
accommodate multiple, complex, and competing goals.  Such techniques do not exist 
in any fully developed form.  They are in the process of creation.  These techniques 
have further implications for institutional configuration.  They suggest that informal 
lateral connections among peer institutions may as important as the internal 
structure of the institutions. 
 I. The Problem With the Business Corporation 
 The call for democratization at the enterprise level arises from 
dissatisfaction with the business corporation.  The critical defining features of the 
business corporation are (a) the attachment of control rights to capital rights, and 
(b) free transferability and accumulability of ownership interests.  In the 1980s, 
these features produced two critical phenomena: (a) the market for corporate 
control, and (b) legal recognition of shareholder value maximization as the meaning 
of managerial fiduciary duty.    
 The for-profit corporate firm lodges control in the firm’s investors, that is, 
those who have the residual claims on its income and assets.  This creates uniquely 
powerful incentives for maximizing profits.  It gives strategic discussion within the 
organization what Claus Offe and Helmut Wisenthal call a “monological” character.1  
From the investor’s perspective, this characteristic is advantageous; it reduces 
“decision costs”.2  Offe and Wisenthal, writing from the left, and Henry Hansmann, 
writing from the center, all attributed the dominance of the business corporation 
over competing forms to its superior ability to devise and commit to a coherent 
strategy.  It is easier to agree on a strategy to maximize profits than on one to 
optimize multiple conflicting goals of various constituencies.   
 However, from a social perspective, there is a disadvantage.  To the extent 
that the corporation’s activities generate negative externalities, the powerful 
internal incentives push against taking account of them.  Public concerns can be 
addressed through regulation to the extent that officials can formulate and enforce 
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regulations effectively.  But the powerful incentives of the for-profit form can induce 
activity designed to defeat effective formulation and enforcement. 
 The conception of the corporation as single-mindedly devoted to profit 
maximization has been around for a century and a half, but it has only recently been 
embraced by the law, and business elites were quite divided about it for much of the 
20th century.    In the mid-20th century, most lawyers and many economists 
advanced a different view.  According to this view, the “separation of ownership and 
control” arising from the dispersion of shares meant that shareholders had limited 
practical opportunities to discipline management.  (The main practical 
opportunities were the proxy contest and the derivative suit, both of which were 
expensive and rare.)  Managers thus had a good deal of discretion.  They could use 
this discretion to profit themselves.  But they could also use it to benefit non-
shareholder constituencies.  These included organized labor, local communities, and 
customers.  Some interpretations of the large mid-century corporation portrayed 
the manager’s role as mediating among shareholders and these other constituencies 
to hold the enterprise together in some productive collaboration.  This portrayal 
was, to varying degrees, both normative and descriptive.3  The courts generally 
upheld management discretion to act in the interest of non-shareholder 
constituencies.   
 Since the 1980s, however, the courts and the corporate elite have embraced 
the monological conception.  On the legal scene, the key development has been the 
hostile takeover.  Prior to its advent, the monological conception would have been 
difficult to enforce.  Courts did not feel they could second-guess management when 
they asserted that some benefit to non-shareholders would serve long-run 
profitability.  But the takeover allows enforcement by the market for corporate 
control.  Entrepreneurs who believe management is failing to maximize profits can 
earn their own profits by acquiring control and replacing the incumbents.  The 
courts, as they cleared the way for the takeover, began to speak about “shareholder 
value” as the governing norm with unprecedented clarity. 4  
 The social disadvantage of the organization’s single-minded focus on profit is 
especially acute to the extent that there is asymmetry of information between public 
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regulators and the organizations.  If the risks regulation addresses are caused by 
technology that is exceptionally complex, evolves rapidly, or varies locally, regulated 
actors are likely to have better understanding than officials.  Their incentives are to 
use this superior understanding to further profits for the enterprise at the expense 
of exacerbating risks that are substantially borne by others.   
 In banking the most pertinent challenges arise from government 
subsidization of  risky activities through such mechanisms as deposit insurance, 
last-resort-lending, and implicit too-big-too-fail bailout insurance.  The banks push 
against regulatory constraints to take on more risk because government subsidizes 
it.  They finance speculative investment at the expense of investment in the real 
economy despite the fact that social returns to latter are higher.  And they are 
indifferent to positive externalities that come from investment in underdeveloped 
regions or disadvantaged people or the environment. 
 A further concern is the potential for exploitation of unsophisticated 
customers that arises from the relative complexity of even routine financial 
transactions.  The increased exposure of banks to competition since the 1980s has 
improved customer service in some ways, but customers are egregiously exploited 
in others.  The recent Wells Fargo scandal that led to the firing of 5,000 employees is 
one of the most extensive consumer frauds in history.   
 Banking is not the only area where the social desirability of the for-profit 
form is being questioned.  In the late 20th century, in several areas where public or 
charitable provision was customary, experiments were undertaken with for-profit 
enterprise.  Efforts were most notable in health care and education.  More radical 
initiatives founded on the same logic occurred with prisons and military services.  In 
all these areas, aggregate performance of for-profit enterprise has disappointed 
proponents, and there have been many scandals.   
 II. Varieties of Enterprise Democracy 
 In the enterprise context, democracy can be understood as greater 
accountability to the general electorate on the one hand or to stakeholders on the 
other.  And within the general and stakeholder fields, we can distinguish relatively 
direct and relatively indirect forms of accountability.  These two parameters yield 
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four types of enterprises: state corporations, state agencies charitable nonprofits, 
and cooperatives.   
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officials, and the entity would be entirely reliant on annual appropriations from a 
general government.  Its resources would be redeployable at the will of the general 
government.  It would have neither taxing nor borrowing authority of its own.  Its 
contracts would be subject to approval by the general government. 
 This description fits many public entities exercising regulatory authority, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency or a local zoning board, and providing 
services, such as the Veterans’ Administration or most public schools or police 
departments.  However, it has often been doubted that such entities are well-suited 
for major financial or economic development roles.  The reasons relate to problems 
with this kind of democratic control.  First, with strong electoral control, it is 
difficult to execute long term plans or projects that extend over many election 
cycles.  Voters can be short-sighted, and their attention can wander.  Only a few 
issues can be salient in a general election; so electoral decision may be inconsistent 
over time as attention flits.  And of course, politicians may use their control 
opportunistically to get short-term electoral benefits.  Think of Richard Nixon 
pumping up the money supply in 1972 or Chris Christie cancelling the Hudson River 
tunnel to protect tax cuts in 2012.   
 An individual or a private organization can undertake long-term projects by 
making long-term contractual commitments.  But government long-term 
commitments compromise strong electoral democracy.  Or at least, this is one 
influential view.  It explains the current constitutional rules in most states that 
require balanced budgets or the common 19th century rule that precluded many 
municipalities from committing to contracts that extended beyond the terms of the 
officials approving them.  On a larger scale, it explains the resistance to independent 
monetary authorities or central bank independence.   Independent monetary 
authorities compromise democratic control.  And they are accused of bias toward 
dogmatic or class-biased tight money policies.  But popular pressures for alternative 
policies can cause harmful inflation or interest rate rises.5   
 The general effects of direct popular control seem unclear, but there are 
ample grounds for caution.  For example, Nathan Jensen and Edmund Malesky 
recently reported a study of local government incentives for business investment.  
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They echo the widely held view among economists that such subsidies tend to be 
ineffective or unnecessarily generous and have regressive fiscal impacts.6  They 
proceeded to study the relative effects of direct and indirect electoral control on the 
propensity to offer such subsidies.  They compared cities managed directly by 
elected officials –mayors and city councils -- with cities in which elected officials 
manage indirectly through an appointed city manager.  The city-manager regimes 
were inaugurated in the Progressive Era out of concern that direct management by 
elected officials was susceptible to voter short-sightedness and official corruption.  
The study vindicates at least the short-sightedness part of the hypothesis.  Mayoral 
regimes are substantially more disposed to offer pointlessly generous subsidies to 
attract businesses than city-manager ones.  The authors suggest that voters penalize 
officials when enterprises leave or fail to come in, but not when subsidies conferred 
on them turn out to be ineffective or unnecessary. 
 The Cooperative.  The second version of directly democratic enterprise is the 
stakeholder-controlled corporation.  The cooperative is the paradigm here.  The 
cooperative is a private entity controlled by its “patrons.”  Patrons have some active 
connection to the enterprise in addition to investment.  Typically, they are 
customers, workers, or suppliers.  The patrons are the residual claimants on the 
firm’s income and (though there is some ambiguity here) assets.  In uniting control 
and residual economic claims, the cooperative resembles the business corporation.  
But there are key differences.  The patron’s economic claims cannot be transferred 
independently of their control claims, and since their control claims are premised on 
some active participatory role, new owners must be approved by the remaining 
owners.  So shares are not freely transferable.  There is thus no possibility of a 
hostile takeover. 
 In addition, control rights in the cooperative are generally distributed equally 
without regard to investment.  Each member gets one vote.  Financial reward is 
distributed on the basis of a combination of investment and economic participation 
(“patronage”).   
 The cooperative is the enterprise form that most embodies democratic 
ideals.  But it has disadvantages, and experience with it has been mixed.  Two 
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problems arise from the incompleteness of representation.  Typically, only one set of 
stakeholders is represented, although others are affected.  For example, agricultural 
marketing cooperatives, which are controlled by suppliers (farmers), have engaged 
in anti-competitive practices that harm consumers.  And then, the democratic 
promise is only fulfilled when stakeholders who are represented devote effort to 
governance.  Passive or indifferent patrons are vulnerable to exploitation, as 
illustrated by some cooperative (mutual) insurance companies that have been re-
organized to allow management to appropriate patron capital. 
 Moreover, cooperatives have difficulty expanding because they cannot 
provide controlling interests (equity) to outsiders.7  They can expand only through 
debt or capital contributions and retained earnings of patrons.  In many 
organizations, patrons will have limited ability to finance themselves.   
 Still another problem arises from the distributive disjunction between 
control and reward.  Control is distributed equally, but there can be wide variation 
among economic shares.  So the problem arises that members with poor economic 
endowments may use their control in ways that redistribute away from those with 
relatively rich claims.  If there is inequality, the poor may have different preferences 
about retaining and distributing earnings and about consumption within the 
enterprise.  This can produce the kind of internal conflict that threatens the 
enterprise.8  A relevant phenomenon recently seen in law firm general partnerships 
– which used to and still can resemble cooperatives – are disputes over retirement 
programs.  Sometimes the high-billing partners object to firm-wide pension 
programs, which tend to be relatively egalitarian.  When they are outvoted, they 
may leave, sometimes causing the partnership to collapse.  Alternatively, if the 
members with relatively large accounts have voting control, they may use it to alter 
the enterprise form to enable them to cash out the full value of their equity.  The 
prohibition on outside equity narrows the class of buyers for the shares of retiring 
members to newcomers willing and acceptable as patrons.  This lowers their value.  
Older members of successful cooperatives may have strong incentives to push to 
convert the enterprise out of the cooperative form so that the firm can be sold to 
outside investors.  The remaining owners then become employees.9 
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 Perhaps the most distinctive disadvantage of the cooperative form from a 
democratic perspective is a bias toward exclusion.  The bias has two sources.  First, 
because the cooperative relation is a relatively thick one involving multiple 
dimensions, cooperators may be choosy about new entrants in a way that corporate 
shareholders (assuming we’re talking about public corporations) would not be.  
Second, cooperators may worry about internal redistribution.  If new entrants 
generate less income, they will still have equal control rights.  So new entrants who 
seem likely to perform below the average of incumbents will be disfavored. 
 An extreme example of the bias is the New York City housing market where 
for a long time building-wide resident cooperatives were favored over individual 
condominium ownership.  The cooperative form meant that residents were 
mutually responsible for the building mortgage, which made them reluctant to 
admit newcomers with less than average financial resources.  That problem, 
however, could have been mitigated by adopting the condominium form, where 
collective responsibility only applies to the common areas.  Nevertheless, the 
cooperative form was favored because it not only encourages but legitimizes certain 
forms of discrimination that might otherwise be difficult to achieve.  Condominium 
owners have no standard mechanism to veto people to whom their neighbors wish 
to sell.  And the law makes it difficult to achieve such vetoes contractually by 
severely limiting enforcement of “restraints on alienation”.  The cooperative form, 
on the other hand, requires a collective judgment before a sale can occur.10  
Residents can use their veto to exclude people they dislike for virtually any reason.  
In theory, they are still bound by anti-discrimination law with respect to race and 
other protected characteristics, but it is very difficult to prove that a decision was 
based on such considerations. 
 In the financial sector, cooperative banks, or “credit unions” as many are 
called, typically limit lending to depositors and often require, in addition, that 
depositors and borrowers have some further relation, such as employment by a 
common employer.  This arrangement makes for trust and information-sharing and 
is associated with lower borrower default rates.  But it limits the range of potential 
participants. 
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 IV. Relatively Indirectly Democratic Enterprise Forms 
 The drafters of the US Constitution rejected “democracy”, their term for 
relatively direct forms of popular rule, for republicanism, their term for relatively 
indirect forms.11  So the President is not elected directly; voters choose electors who 
in turn choose the President.  And until the 17th Amendment, Senators were chosen 
by state legislators. 
 A major source of the drafters’ suspicion of popular control was fear that the 
voters would be short-sighted or reckless in financial matters.  Their solution – 
indirect control – was designed to “refine and enlarge” the views of public officials 
by attenuating their accountability to the electorate.  
 The specific processes of indirect control in the Constitution are not highly 
regarded today.  The indirect election of Senators has been eliminated, and hardly 
anyone defends the electoral college.  But if we look at the institutions that have 
developed to combine public accountability with financial or economic 
development, something like the idea of indirect control is prominent.  The key 
examples are the government corporation and the charitable nonprofit corporation. 
 The Government Corporation.  I use the term government corporation to 
describe a range of entities that are sometimes called corporations – for example, 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation – but also go by other names, especially 
“authority”, as in the Tennessee Valley Authority or state and local redevelopment 
and transportation authorities.  
 The government corporation is an entity treated as a separate accounting 
unit with authority to take various actions (e.g., contracting, holding property, 
borrowing) in its own name and on its own initiative.  However, ultimate control 
and financial rights are retained wholly or mostly by the general government.  The 
governing board of the corporation is mostly appointed by elected officials.  They 
may include stakeholder representatives, but they have fiduciary duties to the entity 
as a whole and are not representatives of the stakeholders in the electoral sense.   
 Typically, electoral control is attenuated by two sorts of mechanism.  First, 
there are control procedures.  The tenures of board members may be staggered 
across electoral cycles, and removal may be precluded except for demonstrable 
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cause.  Thus, elected officials can change control of the corporation only gradually 
and sometimes only over more than a single electoral cycle.  At the sub-national 
level, insulation can be achieved by sharing control of a corporation across separate 
municipalities, counties, or states.  If control is divided among members chosen by 
different jurisdictions, no single electorate can induce a change of control 
unilaterally. 
 The other kind of insulating mechanism concerns finance.  The corporation 
can be given borrowing authority and control over income or assets.  Using the 
assets or income as collateral for borrowing removes them from control of elected 
officials.  And if the corporation controls income flows that exceed its operating and 
debt service costs, it may have substantial discretion to undertake projects free of 
electoral oversight. 
 Transportation and development authorities at the sub-national level 
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of such arrangements.  The authorities 
are able to execute long-range plans that require commitments across many 
electoral cycles and coordination across multiple jurisdictions.  Without their 
relative autonomy from the electoral process, short-sightedness or inconsistency 
and parochialism might preclude valuable initiatives.  On the other hand, political 
insulation is also associated with arrogance and contempt for non-elite interests.   
 The advantages of the state corporation are displayed in the story of the 
massive clean-up of Boston Harbor in the 1980s and 1990s.  For decades the harbor 
was scandalously polluted.  Efforts to remedy the situation failed despite the 
illegality of much of the contributing conduct and broad political support for 
remediation.  A major obstacle appears to have been the extreme fragmentation of 
authority.  Effective intervention occurred only under the prodding of an ambitious 
lawsuit, and its centerpiece was the creation of the Massachusetts Water Resources 
Authority – “a new independently financed state authority to take over the roles of 
planning, constructing and administering” the clean-up. 12   Having proved 
intractable to electoral institutions for decades, the problem was solved with the 
interventions of two non-electoral ones – the court and the independent authority. 
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 Of course, the dark side of the independent authority is even better known, 
especially through Robert Caro’s account of how Robert Moses turned the Triboro 
Bridge and Tunnel Authority into an empire more powerful than the elected 
government of New York.  Moses created a modern automobile-based 
transportation infrastructure but at a cost that included neglect of public 
transportation, the destruction of many vital neighborhoods, and the herding of 
poor people into dysfunctional and under-maintained high-rises.13  
 The Charitable Nonprofit.  The other relatively indirectly democratic 
enterprise form is the charitable nonprofit corporation.14  The charitable nonprofit 
is an extremely flexible instrument.  Anyone can form one, and the law permits 
many control arrangements.  Governing board members can be appointed by public 
officials or private individuals, elected by members (if there are members but there 
need not be), or filled by remaining incumbents as others depart.  Officers and board 
members must act disinterestedly. They may not use control to benefit themselves 
at the expense of other stakeholders. 
 Government subsidizes the organization through tax exemptions for the 
organization and tax benefits for donors.  It polices the organization to make sure 
that (a) its activities are confined to areas that could broadly be characterized as 
charitable (i.e., perform some social good not adequately served by for-profit 
enterprise); (b) it is not being used for private inurement; (c) it is devoting donated 
resources consistently with its undertaking to donors.  But within these broad 
constraints, directors and officers have discretion to pursue the organization’s 
public-regarding goals comparable to the discretion of for-profit managers to 
pursue profit-maximiaing. 
 Viewed individually, charitable nonprofits are not necessarily democratic, 
though they can be.  Nonprofits need not have members at all, and their boards can 
be self-perpetuating oligarchies.  However, excessively narrow control groups may 
raise doubts about whether activities are truly charitable or involve private 
inurement and are thus discouraged by the prospect of regulatory scrutiny.  
Moreover, nonprofits can be strongly democratic, and both private and public 
contributions to them can be conditioned on democratic governance.  For example, 
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nonprofits wishing to be characterized as “community development corporations”, 
in order qualify for certain grants, must admit all interested members of their 
catchment area to membership and allow them to elect a portion of the board.   
 Viewed collectively, the nonprofit sphere has democratically attractive 
features.  Since it accommodates initiative so easily, it makes possible diversity and 
experimentation.   
 Governance aside, accountability can arise to the extent that the enterprise 
depends on public financial support.  The law is ambivalent about the degree of 
economic autonomy nonprofits should have.  An enterprise that starts out with or 
accumulates a large endowment can operate on its passive income without any need 
to raise more.  Many view this as problematical.  Just as control over public 
resources can insulate the state corporation from political accountability, control 
over its own capital can insulate nonprofits from the accountability that arises from 
the need to convince current donors, contractors, or patrons of the value of its 
services.  Thus, there are doctrines designed to limit this kind of insulation, though 
they tend to be half-hearted.  One rule measures the degree of a nonprofit’s income 
that comes from “public support” (current donations, fees for charitable services, 
government contracts) as opposed to passive income and imposes some 
disadvantages on those who fail to meet a minimum.   Another requires “private 
foundations” (enterprises that make grants from endowment income) to spend at 
least five percent of their endowment each year. 
 V. The Influence of Dialogic Assessment on Enterprise Form 
 The four alternative forms either demand or permit control structures more 
conducive to democratic accountability than those of the business corporation.  
They also prescribe or encourage enterprise norms that are diverse and public-
regarding.  They require “dialogic” assessment that considers and reconciles 
multiple values.  (The cooperative is a partial exception to the claim about public-
regarding ends.  In principle, cooperatives maximize the welfare of their members.  
However, since their members occupy multi-stranded relations with each other – as 
both capital suppliers and patrons/participants, their interests are diverse and may 
diverge less from public ones.) 
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 In addition, all four of the alternative forms depart from the incentive 
structure of the business corporation.  They eliminate or, in the case of cooperatives, 
limit the opportunities of managers to profit from capital gains and limit their ability 
to benefit from increases in the enterprise’s income.   This blunts high-powered 
incentives to evade regulatory restrictions or create negative public externalities.  
There are of course disadvantages.  There are no material incentives for innovation 
or cost minimization comparable to those in private enterprise.  And of course, 
“decisions costs” may be higher because conversations about goals or performance 
are longer and more complex.   
 The main material incentive for these enterprises is the continuing need to 
attract new resources without the ability to offer capital shares.  The enterprises 
must convince people to pay for their services (either on a first-party or third-party 
basis) and/or to make donations, and this will usually mean convincing them of the 
value of their efforts.  As a purely economic matter, these incentives are not high-
powered.  Donors have limited ability to monitor performance, and large 
endowments or underserved reputations sometimes allow organization to escape 
pressures for accountability. 
 Granting that the alternative forms avoid the limitations of monological 
assessment, the question remains how the more complex assessment they make 
possible is to be organized.  To begin with, how do we limit the assessment criteria 
so that they provide some discipline?  If the criteria are too vague and too 
numerous, it will be hard to generate meaningful conclusions about performance.  
Moreover, once the criteria are limited and specified, they will have to be revised to 
take account of unforeseen consequences – counterproductive adaptation (e.g., 
“teaching to the test”), collateral consequences, or technological innovations.  Once 
we allow for the need for continuing reconsideration of the criteria, every 
unflattering measurement can be interpreted as either an indication of poor 
performance or a symptom that the metric needs revision. 
 Another problem has to do with learning.  The for-profit form creates strong 
individual incentives for firms to learn, but it also encourages them to hide a lot of 
the knowledge they acquire from their competitors and to distort the information 
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they provide shareholders and regulators.  The market deals with slow learners by 
eliminating them, not by helping them learn.  The alternative enterprise forms are 
more conducive to information sharing.  The problem is that there is some trade-off 
in the design of an assessment regime between facilitation of learning and 
motivation of effective effort.  The criteria that have the most diagnostic value may 
not be the ones that most readily facilitate rankings or threshold determinations 
that can justify sanctions, such as withdrawal of resources. 
 There is no definitive solution to these problems, but responses to them have 
tended to converge in a distinctive architecture.15  Assessment takes the form of a 
kind of deliberative engagement across firms or organizations.  The organizational 
structure is neither a market nor a bureaucracy but a set of shifting and informal 
networks.   
 The most distinctive mechanism is peer review.  Organizations are assessed 
by teams of outsiders from organizations performing tasks similar to theirs.  The 
practice is most fully developed in medicine, especially with respect to hospitals16, 
but it is pervasive.  Peer review strives to combine learning with comparative 
assessment. Metrics tend to emphasize diagnosis, and they are explicitly provisional.  
A central focus of inquiry is the organization’s capacity to adapt to new 
circumstances, learn from its mistakes, and integrate new knowledge generated 
elsewhere.  Yet, such reviews often generate rankings and comparisons.   Rankings 
and comparisons have diagnostic value because they indicate where the best 
practices are to be discovered.  But they also can serve accountability purposes. 
 The term peer review connotes a horizontal dimension, but the process has 
hierarchical elements.  The process must be organized across firms by a 
coordinating organization.  This organization might be controlled collectively by the 
firms under review themselves, but more commonly it is a nonprofit corporation 
with substantial representation of those under review but with significant, often 
controlling, representation by other stakeholders. 17  
 A further hierarchical dimension arises from the use the peer review process 
as an indicator or requirement by regulators, funders, and customers.  For example, 
in the medical area, participation in the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of 
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Hospitals (JCAH) process and minimally satisfactory ratings are conditions of 
various professional licenses and reimbursement by Medicare and private insurers. 
 The peer review process presupposes a willingness to share knowledge 
across firms.  The process is thus limited in the for-profit sector.  True, there is quite 
a bit of knowledge sharing in the for-profit sector.  Many of the hospitals in the JCAH 
network are for-profit.  Nevertheless, for-profit firms will not freely share 
information on matters on which they are competing intensely.  Conversely, it is an 
advantage for nonprofit organization that it lessens this inhibition. 
 The most developed performance metrics in the financial sector are the 
traditional accounting norms of profitability and “safety and soundness.”  Efforts 
have begun only relatively recently to develop metrics that take account of other 
social goals.  For example, there is the Global Impact Investing Rating System 
overseen by the Global Impact Investment System. These approaches, however, 
have a long way to go to achieve the sophistication of the hospital regime or to 
provide the requisites of accountability for a broadened nonprofit financial sector. 
 Peer review regimes generate accountability in two distinctive ways.  First, 
peer review constitutes accountability at the firm level.  Practitioners account to 
peers.  This is a somewhat different accountability from that overseen directly by 
either public officials or stakeholders.  Peer reviewers typically do not hold public 
office and are not electorally accountable.  Although they may have stakes in the 
industry, they do not have stakes in the firm under review, and they are supposed to 
be disinterested, not representative in the political sense.  Part of the rationale for 
these regimes is that the duty to explain your practices and submit to the judgment 
of peers contributes to responsibility both by forcing articulation and reflection and 
through mechanisms of pride and shame. 
 At a second level, the regimes induce accountability by making the 
organization’s operations more transparent to outsiders, including both 
stakeholders and electorally accountable officials.  The outsiders can use this 
information to make much more plausible judgments than they otherwise could 
about what support to give the organizations. 
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 For immediate purposes, the key point is that attempt to democratize the 
financial sector depends at least as much on the development of these mechanisms 
of transparency and responsibility as on the choice among alternative enterprise 
forms. 
 V. Conclusion 
 The business corporation became more narrowly profit-focused at just the 
moment when changes in the financial sector generated opportunities to earn large 
returns by shifting risks to the public sector.  Tightened regulation is one response 
to this situation.  But especially in a technologically dynamic industry, regulators 
have trouble adapting to new contingencies and detecting innovative forms of 
evasion.  So there is some appeal to an alternative approach to aligning private and 
social incentives – a change in enterprise structure.  This move is sometimes 
characterized in terms of economic democracy and could involve democracy in two 
ways – by enhancing electoral control over the enterprise or by providing more 
control to people with interests other than profit.  All the relevant enterprise forms 
have disadvantages, however, and it is arguable the ones affording the most direct 
democratic control tend to be the least effective.  In any event, whichever of the 
nonprofit forms is chosen, accountability will defend on effective modes of 
assessment and information sharing across enterprises. 
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